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1Abstract
Motivated by the success of internal habit formation preferences in explaining asset pric-
ing puzzles, we introduce these preferences in a life-cycle model of consumption and portfolio
choice with liquidity constraints, undiversiﬁable labor income risk and stock-market partic-
ipation costs. In contrast to the initial motivation, we ﬁnd that the model is not able to
simultaneously match two very important stylized facts: a low stock market participation
rate, and moderate equity holdings for those households that do invest in stocks. Habit
formation increases wealth accumulation because the intertemporal consumption smoothing
motive is stronger. As a result, households start participating in the stock market very
early in life, and invest their portfolios almost fully in stocks. Therefore, we conclude that,
with respect to its ability to match the empirical evidence on asset allocation behavior, the
internal habit formation model is dominated by its time-separable utility counterpart.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E21, G11.
Key Words: Life-Cycle Asset Allocation, Habit Formation, Liquidity Constraints, Stock
Market Participation Costs, Uninsurable Labor Income Risk.
21 Introduction
Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) have shown that, under certain conditions, optimal
portfolio allocation between a riskless and a risky asset does not depend on the investment
horizon and, as a result, the optimal asset mix between risky and riskless securities should
remain constant as the investor ages. The conditions required to obtain this result are ho-
mothetic preferences, independently and identically distributed returns, frictionless markets
and the absence of labor income. Merton (1971) shows how the same results hold with labor
income in a complete markets set-up, in which the investors are allowed to borrow against
their human capital and to insure their labor income risk, while Bodie, Merton and Samuel-
son (1991) extend the model to emphasize how the extent of labor supply ﬂexibility over the
life-cycle can change optimal portfolio composition.
In the context of life-cycle asset allocation, the absence of uninsurable labor income
can be questioned. Human capital is a large component of a typical investor’s wealth, and
to the extent that both the level and risk of labor income change over the life-cycle, and
markets to insure such idiosyncratic risks are missing, age-varying investment strategies
can arise. Indeed, recently, ﬁnancial economists have begun to study the optimal portfolio
allocation behavior in the context of models with stochastic uninsurable labor income and
borrowing constraints.1 Motivated by recent empirical work (Vissing-Jorgensen (2001) and
Paiella (1999)) that suggests that small, ﬁxed, entry costs can explain the observed low
stock market participation rates, some of these papers have also introduced such costs in the
life-cycle model.2
1Heaton and Lucas (1996, 1997, 2000), Koo (1998), Viceira (2001) and Haliassos and Michaelides (2003)
extend the inﬁnite horizon buﬀer stock model of Deaton (1991) by including a portfolio choice between
a risky and riskless asset. Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999), Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout
(2001), Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001), Cocco (2001) extend the life-cycle model of Carroll (1997) and
Gourinchas and Parker (2002), in the same direction. Bertaut and Haliassos (1997) analyze small scale three
period models where each period amounts to 20 years, while Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002)
and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001) analyze the general equilibrium implications of these models.
2Considering explicitly the participation decision can also be motivated by recent empirical evidence that
for households that do hold equity, the equity premium can potentially be rationalized by the consumption
risk of the stock market (for example, Parker, 2001).
3However, two important predictions of this literature are still at odds with the observed
empirical regularities.3 First, the calibrated life-cycle portfolio choice model predicts a coun-
terfactually high stock market participation rate. Second, households will invest almost all
of their wealth in stocks, a result that is particularly strong for young individuals. Neverthe-
less, according to the most recent empirical evidence on life-cycle asset allocation, at least
50% of the population (in any country except the U.S.) does not own equities (either directly
or indirectly through pension plans) while stock market participation in the U.S. has only
passed the ﬁfty percent threshold in 1998-2001 (according to the 2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF)). Moreover, even in a country with a well-developed equity culture like the
U.S., the direct ownership of publicly traded stocks was 21.3% in the 2001 SCF. Further-
more, participation rates increase signiﬁcantly during working life and, even those that do
own equities, still invest a large fraction of their ﬁnancial wealth in alternative assets.
In this paper we extend the ﬁnite horizon portfolio choice model with a ﬁxed participation
cost by introducing internal habit formation in preferences.4 The motivation comes from the
relative success of habit formation models in solving asset pricing puzzles56 and aggregate
consumption dynamics.7 Habit formation models can be distinguished along two diﬀerent
dimensions. First, while some papers (for example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and
Chan and Kogan (2002)) use an external habit speciﬁcation where the habit depends on
3See Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996), Bertaut and Haliassos (1997), King and Leape (1998), Poterba
and Samwick (1999), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Davis and Willen (2001), Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) and
Guiso, Haliassos and Japelli (2002).
4Heaton and Lucas (1997) study the impact habit formation in a inﬁnite horizon model with uninsurable
labor income risk. Concurrent work by Polkovnichenko (2002) also studies the asset allocation implications
of a life-cycle model with internal, additive habit formation preferences.
5See Sundaresan (1989), Constantinides (1990), Ferson and Constantinides (1991), Abel (1990, 1999),
Detemple and Zapatero (1991), Hindy and Huang (1993), Dybvig (1995), Heaton (1995), Campbell and
Cochrane (1999), Lax (2000), Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001), Dai (2001), Brandt and Wang (2002),
Chan and Kogan (2002), Wachter (2002), and Menzly, Santos and Veronesi (2002).
6Recent work by Chapman (1998), Pijoan-Mas (2001) and Otrok, Ravikumar and Whiteman (2002)
questions some of these results.
7See Heaton (1993), Carroll, Overland and Weil (2000), Fuhrer (2000), Diaz, Pijoan-Mas and Rios Rull
(2000) or Michaelides (2002).
4the consumption of a reference group (for instance, aggregate consumption), others assume
that the habit depends on the individual’s own past consumption (for example Sundaresan
(1989) or Constantinides (1990)). Second, some models specify the argument in the utility
function as the diﬀerence between consumption and habit (additive habit models, such as
Constantinides (1990) or Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), while in others utility is a function
of the ratio between consumption and habit (multiplicative habit models, such as Abel (1990)
or Chan and Kogan (2002)). In this paper, since we are solving an individual agent’s decision
problem and not an equilibrium model, we specify the habit process as a function of the
household’s past consumption. With respect to the utility function, we will consider both
the ratio and additive speciﬁcations. The main conclusions are very similar, and therefore
we start by discussing the ratio model for which the intuition is simpler, and present the
additive model afterwards.
Contrary to the initial motivation, we ﬁnd that introducing habit formation preferences
in the standard life-cycle asset allocation model actually decreases its ability to match the
observed empirical regularities. Households increase wealth accumulation early in life be-
cause the presence of the habit term leads to a stronger incentive to smooth consumption
over time. As a result, relative to the model without habit formation, there is a stronger
motive to pay the stock market entry cost and equity investing takes place much earlier in
life. In a separate paper (Gomes and Michaelides (2002)) we show that in order to match
the participation rates observed in the data, it is important to be able to disentangle risk
aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, so that the latter can be decreased
while keeping the former constant (or that both can be decreased simultaneously). With
habit formation preferences we obtain exactly the opposite result: for a given coeﬃcient of
risk aversion, the EIS is higher than in the corresponding time-separable utility speciﬁca-
tion. With respect to the share of wealth invested in equities, for those households that
do participate in the stock market, the two models deliver essentially the same prediction.
After paying the ﬁxed cost, households will invest most of their wealth in stocks, unless
we consider very high values of risk aversion. This is the extension of the inﬁnite-horizon
result of Heaton and Lucas (1997), and it reﬂects the equity premium puzzle from an asset
allocation perspective.
5These conclusions are robust to the functional form of habit formation: both the ratio and
the additive speciﬁcations produce similar results. In the additive diﬀerence habit model,
risk aversion is now a function of surplus consumption (consumption relative to the habit
level). Therefore, a stronger habit preference, besides making the investor more willing to
smooth consumption intertemporally, also increases risk aversion and prudence. As a result,
strengthening the habit motive generates even more wealth accumulation early in life than
in the ratio habit model. Therefore the investor has a stronger incentive to pay the ﬁxed
cost and stock market participation is again close to 100% from very early on in life (within
ﬁve years of working life).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we describe the model and the
solution technique. In sections three and four we discuss the results for the multiplicative
habit speciﬁcation for the case without, and with, the ﬁxed entry cost, respectively. In




Time is discrete and t denotes adult age which, following the typical convention in this liter-
ature, corresponds to eﬀective age minus 19. Each period corresponds to one year and agents
live for a maximum of T =8 1periods (age 100). The probability that a consumer/investor
is alive at time (t +1 )conditional on being alive at time t is denoted by pt (p0 =1 ) .
As mentioned before, we start by specifying a “ratio habit model” (surplus consumption is
given by the ratio between consumption and the habit persistence term) and later on we will
consider a “diﬀerence or additive habit model” (where surplus consumption is given by the
diﬀerence between consumption and the habit persistence term). There is one non-durable







6where Ht is the habit level at the beginning of period t,a n dρ is the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion.
The importance of the habit is controlled by the parameter γ, where γ ∈ [0,1].I fγ =0 ,
habits do not aﬀect the felicity function, which then becomes the standard time separable
function with CRRA parameter equal to ρ. The habit level evolves according to the following
law of motion:
Ht =( 1− λ)Ht−1 + λCt−1 (2)
where λ ∈ [0,1]. We can obtain more intuition by looking at the case of λ =1 ,f o rw h i c h








This illustrates the importance of consumption smoothing in habit formation models. The
utility in each period is given by a weighted average of both the level and the change in
consumption. For γ =0only current consumption matters, while for γ =1only consumption
growth is important. The investor’s subjective discount factor is constant and denoted by
β.
2.2 Labor Income Process
The labor income process before retirement is the same as the one used by Gourinchas and
Parker (2002), or Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999), and it is given by
Yit = PitUit (4)
Pit =e x p ( f(t,Zit))Pit−1Nit (5)
where f(t,Zit) is a deterministic function of age and household characteristics Zit, Pit is a
“permanent” component, and Uit a transitory component. We assume that the lnUit, and





n, respectively. The log of Pit, evolves as a random walk with a deter-
ministic drift, f(t,Zit).
8With this speciﬁcation the mean of the level of the log random variables equals 1.
7Given these assumptions, the growth in individual labor income follows
∆lnYit = f(t,Zit)+l nNit +l nUit − lnUit−1, (6)
and its unconditional variance equals (σ2
n +2σ2
u). This process has a single Wold representa-
tion that is equivalent to the MA(1) process for individual earnings growth estimated using
household level data (MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989), and Pischke (1995)).9
For simplicity, retirement is assumed to be exogenous and deterministic, with all house-
holds retiring in time period K, corresponding to age 65 (K =4 6 ). Earnings in retirement
(t>K ) follow: Yit = θPiK, where θ is the replacement ratio (a scalar between zero and one).
This speciﬁcation considerably facilitates the solution of the model, as it does not require
the introduction of an additional state variable (see solution method section).
2 . 3 A s s e t sa n dw e a l t ha c c u m u l a t i o n
The investment opportunity set is constant and there are two ﬁnancial assets, one riskless
asset (treasury bills or cash) and one risky asset, stocks. The riskless asset yields a constant
gross after tax real return, Rf, while the risky asset’s returns (denoted by Rt)a r eg i v e nb y
Rt+1 − R
f = µ + εt+1 (7)
where εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε).
Before investing in stocks for the ﬁrst time, the investor must pay a ﬁxed cost. This entry
fee represents both the explicit transaction cost from opening a brokerage account and, more
importantly, the (opportunity) cost of acquiring information about the stock market. The
ﬁxed cost (F) is scaled by the level of the permanent component of labor income (Pit) as
this will simplify the solution of the model, but is also motivated by an opportunity cost
interpretation for this entry fee.
Following Deaton (1991) we denote cash on hand as the liquid resources available for
consumption and saving. We deﬁne a dummy variable IP which is equal to one when the
9Although these studies generally suggest that individual income changes follow a MA(2), the MA(1) is
found to be a close approximation.
8cost is incurred for the ﬁrst time and zero otherwise. When the stock market entry fee has
n o tb e e np a i dy e t ,n e x tp e r i o d ’ sc a s ho nh a n d( Xi,t+1)i sg i v e nb y
Xi,t+1 = SitRt+1 + BitR
f + Yi,t+1 − FIPPi,t+1 (8)
where Sit and Bit denote, respectively, stock holdings and riskless asset holdings (cash) at
time t.I ft h eﬁxed cost was already paid in the past, we have
Xi,t+1 = SitRt+1 + BitRf + Yi,t+1 (9)
Moreover, the household must allocate her cash-on-hand (Xit) between consumption expen-
ditures (Cit) and savings, so that
Xit = Cit + Sit + Bit (10)
Finally, as in Deaton (1991), we prevent households from borrowing against their future labor
income, and also allow no short selling. Speciﬁcally, we impose the following restrictions:
Bit ≥ 0 (11)
Sit ≥ 0 (12)
2.4 The optimization problem and solution method










Hit =( 1− λ)Hit−1 + λCit−1 (14)
Xit+1 = SitRt+1 + BitRf + Yit+1 − F ∗ IP ∗ Pit+1 (15)
Xit = Sit + Bit + Cit (16)
Bit ≥ 0,S it ≥ 0 (17)
Rt+1 − Rf = µ + εt+1, εt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ε) (18)
9Yit = PitUit,P it =e x p ( f(t,Zit))Pit−1Nit,i ft 6 K (19)
Yit = θPiK, if t>K (20)
Analytical solutions to this problem do not exist. We therefore use a numerical solution
method based on the maximization of the value function to derive optimal policy functions
for total savings and the share of wealth invested in the stock market. The details are given
in appendix A, and here we just present the main idea. We ﬁrst simplify the solution by
exploiting the scale-independence of the maximization problem and rewriting all variables as
ratios to the permanent component of labor income (Pit). The equations of motion and the
value function can then be rewritten as normalized variables and we use lower case letters
to denote them (for instance, xit ≡
Xit
Pit and hit ≡
Hit
Pit ). This allows us to reduce the number
of state variables to four: age (t), normalized cash-on-hand (xit), normalized habits (hit)
and participation status (whether the ﬁxed cost has already been paid or not). In the last
period the policy functions are trivial (the agent consumes all available wealth) and the
value function corresponds to the indirect utility function. We can use this value function
to compute the policy rules for the previous period and the corresponding value function.
This procedure is then iterated backwards. We optimize over the diﬀerent choices using grid
search.
2.5 Parameter Calibration
In our “baseline” set of parameter values we set the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion equal
to 2, the mean equity premium equal to 4 percent and the standard deviation of the risky
investment equal to 18 percent. Considering an equity premium of 4% (as opposed to the
historical 6%) is a fairly common choice in this literature10 a n dt h i si sm o t i v a t e db yt w o
diﬀerent concerns. First, Campbell et al. (2001) argue that this is actually a better measure
of a forward-looking equity premium. Second, even after having paid the ﬁxed entry cost, the
average investor still faces non-trivial transaction costs, mostly in the form of mutual fund
fees. This adjustment is a short-cut representation for those costs, since the dimensionality
10See, for example, Yao and Zhang (2002), Cocco (2001) or Campbell et al. (2001). Dammon, Spatt and
Zhang (2001) use an even lower value.
10of the problem prevents us from modelling them explicitly (as in Heaton and Lucas (1997),
for example). For the purpose of this paper, if we were to consider a higher equity premium,
this would only make our point stronger as it would make it even harder for the model to
match the empirical evidence. Nevertheless, we do experiment and present results for equity
premia of 2.5% and 5.5%. The annual discount rate, β,i sﬁxed at 0.95 (we also present
experiments for lower discount factors) and the constant real interest rate, r, is set equal to
2%.
Carroll (1992) estimates the standard deviations of the idiosyncratic shocks using data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and we use values close to those: around 10
percent per year for σu and 8 percent per year for σn.11 The deterministic labor income
proﬁle is chosen to reﬂect the hump shape of earnings over the life cycle and the parameter
values are taken from Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999). The retirement transfers are
also calibrated using the estimation results from Cocco et al. (1999) and are set to around
68 percent of labor income in the last period of working life (we also present results for
replacement rates equal to 45% and 85%). With respect to the ﬁxed cost of participation
we consider two cases. One case where we set this cost equal to zero and one case where we
set it equal to 0.1, corresponding to 10 percent of the household’s expected annual income.
One important correlation is that between labor income shocks and stock returns. Given
that there are two earnings shocks, the ﬁrst issue arises with the correlation between the
transitory earnings shock and stock returns. Viceira (2001) and Haliassos and Michaelides
(2003) show that varying the correlation between the transitory earnings shock and the stock
return does not aﬀect the portfolio choice allocation; similar results hold here and are there-
fore omitted. Substantial hedging demands do arise, however, when the correlation between
permanent earnings shocks and stock returns is positive (especially for higher risk aversion
coeﬃcients). The microeconometric evidence on this correlation is scant, however, partly
b e c a u s em i c r od a t am i g h tn o to ﬀer a long enough panel to compute the necessary time
series correlations with aggregate stock returns. The decomposition of individual earnings
growth rates into permanent and transitory shocks, for instance, relies on the cross-sectional
11These values are also consistent with Deaton (1991).
11moments (see Abowd and Card (1989), for instance). Computing the correlation of the idio-
syncratic earnings innovation with stock returns, however, will need to rely on time series
moments, and will probably suﬀer from a ﬁnite sample bias problem (Jermann, (1999)). As
a ﬁrst step, Davis and Willen (2001) have estimated this correlation, and oﬀer estimates
between approximately zero and 0.3. On the other hand, Campbell et al. (2001) and Heaton
and Lucas (2000) only ﬁnd such results when considering small subgroups of the population
(for instance, self-employed households or households with private businesses). A priori,
given that aggregate shocks are a small component of total individual earnings volatility
(Pischke (1995)), we might expect the correlation of permanent idiosyncratic earnings in-
novations and aggregate stock returns to be low. Given the small component of aggregate
uncertainty in individual earnings histories and the available empirical evidence to date, we
view the zero correlation as a reasonable hypothesis and use it as the benchmark correlation.
Results are also oﬀered for the case where the correlation is higher (0.3).
The benchmark values of the habit parameters will be γ =0 .8 and λ =0 .5, however we
will consider diﬀerent combinations as well ({λ,γ} = {0.5,0.8},{0.8,0.5},{0.8,0.8},{0.8,1.0}).
Finally, setting γ =0generates the portfolio model over the life-cycle without any habits (the
CRRA model), and will allow us to identify the eﬀects of the habit on optimal consumption
and portfolio choice.
3 Results without Fixed Participation Cost




In this section we study the behavior of the (normalized) consumption function c(xt,h t,t).
Figure 1.1 plots c(ht) at age 25, for our benchmark parameters (γ =0 .8, λ =0 .5 and ρ =2 )
12and diﬀerent habit levels.12 The following comments about this policy function are worth
making. First, for a given habit level, the shape of the consumption policy rule is the same
as in the standard buﬀer stock saving literature. Consumption equals cash on hand below
a certain threshold level, and beyond that level the marginal propensity to consume rapidly
falls. Second, this threshold is increasing in the stock of habits since a higher habit level
requires additional consumption to maintain the same level of utility.
Figure 1.2 plots the consumption policy functions at age 25 for our benchmark parame-
ters, and for the model with habit formation (γ =0 ). The consumption policy rule collapses
in one branch when habits are absent, while for the habit case we only plot the consump-
tion branch that corresponds to the mean habit level associated with the simulations of the
model. These two policy functions show that a higher γ generates a higher saving level (when
the constraint on saving is not binding). A higher γ implies a stronger motive to smooth
consumption over time and thereby generates higher savings.
What explains this result? With multiplicative habit preferences the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion remains constant and equal to ρ. Relative to the model without habits, only
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) changes, as preferences over time and over
contingencies are no longer the same. As we increase the strength of the habit in the utility
function (starting from γ =0 ), the intertemporal consumption smoothing becomes more
important than in the time-separable utility case, thus increasing savings.
3.1.2 Portfolio Allocation Rule
We next focus on the asset allocation decision α(xt,h t,t).F i g u r e1.3 plots the age-25 port-
folio rule as a function of cash-on-hand, for the lowest and highest habit states, using the
benchmark preference parameters (γ =0 .8, λ =0 .5 and ρ =2 ). The qualitative results are
also similar to the ones previously obtained in this literature. Even though labor income is
risky, wage earnings is a closer substitute for the risk-free asset rather than for equities. As
12We will often use the term consumption function to refer to c(xt), conditional on given values of ht and
t. To avoid cluttering, we only plot the policy functions conditional on the habit states that are within 3
standard deviations from the mean habit level in the simulations (while the actual numerical computations
were conducted using a total of 50 habit states).
13a result, the presence of future labor income increases the demand for stocks and the share
invested in equities is a decreasing function of cash-on-hand.
The interesting additional insight involves the behavior of the portfolio allocation, con-
ditional on the habit level. Lower habits generate a higher level of saving than higher habit
levels (see ﬁgure 1.1). Therefore, there is range of cash-on-hand for which positive savings
take place for the lowest habit states, thus generating positive stock holdings, while no sav-
ings occur under the highest states. On the other hand, for high levels of liquid wealth a
higher habit level is associated with a higher optimal equity allocation since the ratio of
savings to future labor income is smaller for a given level of cash on hand.
3.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The strength of the habit (controlled by the parameter γ)a n dt h er a t ew i t hw h i c ht h eh a b i t
depreciates (1−λ) both have a minor impact on the optimal portfolio rules and as such the
results are not shown. This was expected since γ and λ do not aﬀect the investor’s attitude
toward risk. On the other hand, the consumption functions are quite sensitive to γ,a ss h o w n
in ﬁgure 1.4,w h i c hp l o t sc(xt) for age 25 and evaluated at the mean habit level. We ﬁnd
that λ is not very important, for example increasing it from 0.5 to 0.8 (for a given γ)d o e s
not aﬀect the results.13
3.2 Simulation Results
In this section we discuss the implications of the model with respect to consumption, portfolio
holdings and wealth accumulation over the life-cycle. It is common practice for researchers to
simulate a model over the life-cycle for a large number of individuals (say 1000) to compute
the statistics of interest (mean wealth holdings, for instance) for any given age. We use this
method as well but complement it using an alternative, equivalent method of computing
these statistics that is based on calculating the transition distribution of cash on hand and
the habit stock from one age to the next. The main reason for doing this is that we can
concisely plot the wealth distributions over the life cycle using this method.
13Again these results are not shown because the policy functions are almost indistinguishable.
14The numerical details are delegated to appendix B but the intuitive idea is very simple.
Given that normalized cash on hand is a stationary process, it becomes easy to compute the
transition probability from one cash on hand state to another from period to period once the
optimal policy functions have been computed. Given an initial distribution of cash on hand
and habits, the new distribution will be the product of the transition and initial distribution;
this will then become the initial distribution for the next period computation.
Figure 2.1 plots the distributions of normalized cash on hand for diﬀerent habit levels
at age 50. Higher levels of cash on hand are associated with higher habit levels and the
distributions shift to the right as the habit level increases. Figure 2.2 plots the distributions
at mean habit levels during retirement to illustrate how wealth decumulation takes place in
the model during this phase of the life-cycle.
In ﬁgure 2.3 we plot the average wealth accumulation proﬁles over the life cycle for both
the habit and the no-habit model. We assume that all agents start with zero assets and the
lowest possible level of habits. We ﬁnd this assumption convenient and plausible because it
is natural to think that agents who have not inherited large levels of wealth will not have
grown in an environment that would generate high levels of habits. Nevertheless, we have
experimented with higher initial levels of habits and the conclusions remain unchanged after
around ﬁve years of working life (we provide further robustness checks to this assumption in
a later subsection). Wealth accumulation is higher in the habit model, which is consistent
with the consumption policy rules implying higher saving when the strength of the habit is
increased. Finally, ﬁgure 2.4 illustrates the counterfactual prediction of the model: house-
holds invest almost all of their wealth in stocks throughout the life-cycle (and therefore stock
m a r k e tp a r t i c i p a t i o nt a k e sp l a c ea ss o o na sp o s i t i v es a v i n gi su n d e r t a k e n ) .
4 Results with Fixed Participation Cost
We next introduce the positive ﬁxed cost of stock market participation (F). We set this cost
equal to 10% of the household’s expected annual income, which we view as a likely upper
bound on the plausible range of ﬁxed stock market participation costs.
154.1 Computing the Transition Distributions when the Participa-
tion Cost is Positive.
At the beginning of life, the participation rate (proportion of households that have incurred
the ﬁxed cost) is zero. Let ΠO
t denote the mass of agents who have not yet paid the ﬁxed
cost. This is a matrix of probabilities for each value of cash on hand, each habit state and
each age (t). Let ΠO
th denote the vector of probabilities conditional on a given habit state h.
Given their initial savings decisions a new distribution for cash on hand and habits can be
evaluated. We can then compute the proportion of households who would be willing to incur
the ﬁxed cost, by computing the sum of the probabilities in ΠO
th for which x>x ∗
h,w h e r ex∗
h
is the trigger point that causes participation (given by the optimal participation policy rule).
The subscript h emphasizes the dependence of the trigger cash on hand point on the current
habit level. The new participation rate is then obtained by adding to the previous period
participation rate the percentage of households that choose to pay the ﬁxed cost, times the
percentage of households who have never paid the cost in the past. We then compute the
distributions for both participants and non-participants, and use the participation rate to
compute the unconditional distribution of wealth and habits in the economy. Appendix B
explains the computational details.
4.2 On the strength of the substitution eﬀect
An interesting comparison, that will prove important for the results on wealth accumulation
later on in the paper, is the contrast between total saving when access to the stock market
is available, versus the case when wealth can only be invested in the riskless asset. This is
done in ﬁgure 3.1 that plots the consumption policy rule for age 25 for the mean habit level,
under these two alternative scenarios. We conclude that total saving rises in the presence
of a higher-earning investment opportunity and therefore the substitution eﬀect outweighs
t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect. Recall that, in the standard textbook two period model with complete
markets (and in particular, without non-tradable labor income in the second period), the
opposite result is predicted for ρ =2 . This “reversal” is already present in the life-cycle
model without habit formation, but we want to point it out because it will have important
16implications for wealth accumulation and the stock market participation rate in the presence
of the ﬁxed, stock market entry cost.
4.3 Simulation Results
We ﬁrst plot the evolution for the distributions of cash on hand for the two types of agents:
participants and non-participants in the stock market. Households start with zero assets
and the initial habit level is set at the lowest point on the habit grid which corresponds to
around 25% of mean initial earnings (we later show that the implications for stock market
participation and asset allocation are similar if households start from a higher initial habit
level). Figure 3.2 illustrates some of the results by plotting the distributions of normalized
cash on hand for individuals aged 30 who have incurred the ﬁx e dc o s ta n dt h o s ew h oh a v e
not; the distributions are conditional on the mean habit level to avoid cluttering. These
are conditional distributions and the participation rate can be used as a probability weight
to generate the unconditional distribution ofc a s ho nh a n di nt h ec o h o r t . T h ed i v e r g e n c e
of the distributions of cash on hand between participants and non-participants is especially
signiﬁcant if one considers that they both start from identical assets, face the same labor
income process, have the same preferences and this discrepancy takes place within 10 years
from the beginning of working life. These results can be explained by two factors. First, we
have just shown that a higher saving rate arises for stock market participants than for non-
participants (ﬁgure 3.1), thus generating higher wealth accumulation. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, given the volatility of the stock market and the high equity premium,
wealth invested in the stock market will be subject to higher volatility than wealth invested in
the safe asset generating substantial inequality over time between stock market participants
and non-participants. Figure 3.3 plots the distributions of cash on hand conditional on the
mean habit for age 65 for stockholders (everyone has incurred the participation cost by that
time and is a stockholder).
Figure 3.4 plots the unconditional mean consumption and habits over the life-cycle. The
distributions for participants and non-participants are used to compute the respective means
in the two types and then the proportion of stockholders (the participation rate) is used to
17take the unconditional average over the two groups14.F i g u r e3.4 shows that the habit quickly
catches up with consumption early in life, and then tracks it closely over the life-cycle.
We next plot the stock market participation rate over the life cycle (ﬁgure 3.5). Stock
market participation takes place very quickly in this model, as by age 25 all households
already ﬁnd it advantageous to pay the ﬁxed cost. This is explained by the wealth accumu-
lation proﬁles in ﬁgure 2.3: the stronger the habit, the higher the saving rate for any given
level of cash on hand and the stronger the incentive to enter the stock market.
Finally, ﬁgure 3.6 plots the unconditional portfolio allocation over the life-cycle15 and the
portfolio allocation conditional on participating in the stock market.16 The asset allocation
conditional on participation remains (counterfactually) skewed towards stocks. For the un-
conditional distribution the share of wealth in stocks does rise over the life-cycle, but does
so at a very fast rate, governed entirely by the low participation rate observed during the
early working life period.
14Speciﬁcally, let Partt denote the stock market participation rate in the cohort at time (age) t,a n dGx
and Gh denote the number of grid points used to discretize the normalized state variables x ( c a s ho nh a n d )
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Superscript I denotes a variable for households participating in the stock market while superscript O denotes
households out of the stock market.
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184.4 Comparison with the No-Habits Model
Figure 4.1 plots the stock market participation rates over the life-cycle for the two models.
In the no-habits case the typical household stays out of the stock market very early in the
life cycle until enough wealth has been accumulated to warrant paying the participation fee.
As time goes by, a higher percentage of households enters the stock market, and by age
40 everybody has become a stock holder. In the habit model, on the other hand, investors
accumulate a much larger buﬀer stock of wealth at younger ages, and therefore they have a
stronger incentive to pay the ﬁxed cost and invest in the stock market. As a result, stock
market participation is higher for any given age the stronger the habit (ﬁgure 4.1).
Figure 4.2 compares the unconditional mean share of wealth in stocks implied by the
diﬀerent parameter values. The results are just what we would expect after observing ﬁgure
4.1, and give little support to the habit formation model as a realistic description of life-
cycle portfolio allocation behavior. Introducing habit formation preferences increases the
participation rate signiﬁcantly without improving the model’s performance with respect to
equity allocation conditional on participation. More precisely, the habit model still predicts
that, after paying the ﬁxed cost, the average household will invest virtually all of its wealth
in the stock market, at every stage of the life cycle.
4.5 Robustness Checks
We now perturb some of the parameters in the model to investigate the robustness of our
results.
4.5.1 Initial Habit Levels
We ﬁrst investigate the robustness of our conclusions with respect to a change in initial habit
levels. Starting with higher initial habit levels generates lower wealth accumulation early
in life than in the benchmark model as the household has to maintain higher consumption
to support the higher inherited habit level. Figure 5.1 plots the unconditional mean wealth
proﬁles for the benchmark case, and the cases with initial habits equal to 80 and 100 percent
of mean expected labor income, respectively. Higher initial assets generate lower wealth
19accumulation as the household needs to maintain a higher consumption level to satisfy the
higher initial habit level. Moreover, the diﬀerence in the proﬁles is starkest earlier in life when
initial assets are low and the diﬀerences get smaller as the average household approaches
retirement. Figure 5.2 plots the corresponding stock market participation rates over the
life cycle. The lower wealth accumulation associated with the higher initial habits does
not aﬀect substantially the decision of whether to incur the ﬁxed cost and enter the stock
market since stock market participation is complete within the ﬁrst ﬁve years of working
life for all three speciﬁcations. The complete portfolio specialization in stocks result is also
preserved (not reported for space considerations), leading us to conclude that the asset
allocation (conditional on participation) counterfactual implications of the model persist.
We conclude that our results are robust to changes in the initial conditions for habit levels.
4.5.2 Equity Premium
We consider equity premia of 2.5 and 5.5 percent (the benchmark is 4 percent).17 Increasing
the equity premium generates higher wealth accumulation because the substitution eﬀect
in the model is stronger than the income eﬀect. Stock market participation is naturally
increasing in the equity premium but the quantitative eﬀects are very similar across the
calibrations. For instance, for the lowest equity premium everybody has incurred the ﬁxed
cost (and holds stocks) by age 25, whereas for the highest equity premium this happens by
age 24, practically an identical prediction. Asset allocation conditional on participation does
not change much in quantitative terms either: the almost complete portfolio specialization
in stocks persists for all equity premia throughout the life cycle. Speciﬁcally, by age 65 the
share of wealth in stocks from the lowest to the highest equity premium is 99.5%, 98% and
96% respectively and the increased diversiﬁcation as one approaches retirement arises from
the higher wealth accumulation associated with the higher equity premium.
17W ed on o tr e p o r tt h er e s u l t si nﬁgures or tables due to space considerations but instead summarize them
in the text.
204.5.3 Replacement Ratio
We consider two deviations from the benchmark replacement ratio of 68%:al o w e rl e v e lo f
45% a n da nu p p e rl e v e lo f85%.18 A lower replacement ratio during retirement generates
higher saving during working life and therefore a stronger incentive to participate in the stock
market early on and vice versa for a higher replacement ratio. Quantitatively, however, the
implications of the model are again very similar, as in both cases by age 25 everyone in the
economy has incurred the ﬁxed cost and has become a stock market participant.
With regards to portfolio allocation conditional on participation, the higher saving as-
sociated with the lower replacement ratio induces the household to invest partially in the
riskless asset. Nevertheless, the complete portfolio specialization in stocks persists until age
43 and only decreases to 91% by age 65. For the highest replacement ratio model, the
complete portfolio specialization in stocks persists throughout the life cycle.
4.5.4 CRRA coeﬃcient
We have increased the CRRA coeﬃcient from the benchmark of ρ =2to ρ =5and ρ =8 .
Higher risk aversion reduces the willingness to hold risky assets but it also implies higher
prudence, and thus the household accumulates more wealth over the life cycle. Higher
wealth accumulation increases the incentive to incur the ﬁxed cost and actually outweighs
the disincentive implied by higher risk aversion. With regards to the decision to incur the
ﬁxed cost, the results are similar across parameters because stock market participation takes
place very fast (for ρ =2everyone has incurred the ﬁxed cost by age 23 while this happens
by age 24 for ρ =5and ρ =8 ).
The eﬀects on portfolio choice are more substantial and are shown in ﬁgure 5.3.I nt h e
beginning of the life cycle, when ﬁnancial assets as a percentage of total wealth are small,
the portfolio is tilted completely in the risky ﬁnancial asset. For the benchmark model,
this result persists almost throughout the life cycle. For the higher risk aversion coeﬃcients,
however, the higher wealth accumulation implied by the model and the reduced willingness of
18W ed on o tr e p o r tt h er e s u l t si nﬁgures or tables due to space considerations but instead summarize them
in the text.
21the household to hold the risky asset, generates a substantial decrease in the share of wealth
held in the risky asset market as the household ages. It is instructive to point out the conﬂict
between risk aversion and prudence in matching jointly the stock market participation and
the asset allocation decision. Increasing risk aversion generates a higher co-existence between
stocks and the riskless asset in the portfolio, but a higher risk aversion also implies higher
prudence and therefore higher wealth accumulation increasing the incentive to incur the ﬁxed
cost and participate in the stock market.
4.5.5 Discount Rate
How does the discount rate aﬀect the stock market participation and asset allocation de-
cision? We have increased the discount rate to 7 and 10 percent from the benchmark 5
percent level and the quantitative conclusions from the model remain unchanged. Increased
impatience generates lower wealth accumulation and therefore a weaker incentive to incur
the ﬁxed cost. Nevertheless, the only change is that everyone incurs the ﬁxed cost by age
25 for δ =0 .07 and δ =0 .1 whereas this happens by age 24 for the benchmark δ =0 .05
(see ﬁgure 5.4). Moreover, because of the lower wealth accumulation implied by the higher
discount rates, the complete portfolio specialization in stocks result becomes even stronger:
for the ten percent discount rate the share of wealth allocated to stocks remains at 100%
throughout the life cycle.
4.5.6 Correlation between Permanent Earnings Shocks and Stock Returns
Consistent with previous results in the literature, the correlation between the transitory and
the stock return innovations does not aﬀect the results and is therefore not reported. The
correlation between permanent earnings and stock return shocks can, on the other hand,
generate substantial hedging demands. We have discussed in the calibration section our
choice of the benchmark correlation equal to zero and why an upper bound of around 0.3
might be a reasonable choice based on the empirical evidence. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 compare
the unconditional portfolio allocations over the life cycle for ρ =2and ρ =5 , respectively,
for the two cases where the correlation is zero and 0.3 (all other parameters are set at their
22benchmark values). With regards to the stock market participation decision, the presence
of positive correlation does not aﬀect total savings, regardless of the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, and the stock market participation decisions are not therefore aﬀected: stock
market participation is at 100% within the ﬁrst 5 years of the working life. The correlation,
however, can potentially have important eﬀects on the asset allocation decision. Consistent
with previous results in the literature this correlation is not very important for low values of
risk aversion. Figure 5.5, for instance, shows that the share of wealth in stocks is not aﬀected
much relative to the benchmark zero correlation case. The correlation can have a bigger eﬀect
for higher risk aversion coeﬃcients, as is illustrated in ﬁgure 5.6. Nevertheless, even for this
conﬁguration of parameter values the hedging demand generated by this correlation is very
small in magnitude.
5 Additive Habit Model
5.1 Speciﬁcation, Risk aversion and Prudence
Until now, we have assumed a ratio habit model: surplus consumption (the argument in
the utility function) is given by the ratio between consumption and the habit level. We
now consider an “additive habit model”: surplus consumption is given by the diﬀerence
between consumption and the habit persistence term (following Sundaresan (1989), Con-
stantinides (1990) and Detemple and Zapatero (1991), among others). More precisely, the





Unlike in the previous speciﬁcation, both risk aversion and prudence are now dependent on
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23As consumption falls towards the habit level, the investor simultaneously becomes more
risk averse and more prudent.19 In the context of a life-cycle model this implies that both
prudence and risk aversion will vary with age.
5.2 Baseline Results
R e l a t i v et ot h en o - h a b i tc a s e( γ =0 ) wealth accumulation now increases for two reasons:
in addition to the change in the EIS already present in the ratio habit model, households
also become more prudent. From equation (22) we see that risk aversion is a decreasing
function of surplus consumption (Ct−γHt) so we expect households to reduce their demand
for stocks. In theory, if this eﬀect is strong enough then it could even aﬀect the participation
decision early in life.
Figure 6.1 plots the life-cycle patterns of risk-aversion and prudence for the average
household, for ρ =2 , γ =0 .5 and λ =0 .5.T h e t w o c o e ﬃcients move together since,
conditional on Ct and Ht, one is a linear transformation of the other. Since (for now) we
set H1 =0 , risk aversion and prudence at age 20 are equal to their CRRA values, 2 and 3
respectively. As surplus consumption (Ct − γHt) decreases both coeﬃcients increase. This
eﬀect is quite strong early in life since the habit level is rising very fast, and as a result
risk aversion nearly doubles from age 20 to age 30. However, it remains almost unchanged
during the rest of the life-cycle, as agents have already accumulated enough wealth to smooth
consumption over time. Based on these results, the diﬀerence habit model with ρ =2should
generate results which will be very similar to the ones obtained with a ratio habit model and
ρ =4 , with some small diﬀerences during the ﬁrst few years of the life-cycle.
As expected, the model predicts a counterfactually high wealth accumulation (ﬁgure 6.2)
and this induces households to pay the entry cost earlier in life (ﬁgure 6.3). Finally, the
average share of wealth invested in stocks is close to 100% at every age (ﬁgure 6.3).
19Naturally, if we set γ =0we get the standard CRRA results.
245.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we restrict the sensitivity analysis to the most important new parameters.
Results for the remaining comparative statics are identical to the ones obtained with the
ratio habit model and they are available upon request.
5.3.1 Initial habit level
The pattern of risk aversion in ﬁgure 6.1 is driven by our assumption of a zero initial habit
level, at least during the ﬁrst years of the life-cycle. If we increase the initial habit we reduce
surplus wealth of the young households, and consequently increase their risk aversion. Figure
6.4 plots risk-aversion over the life-cycle, for diﬀerent levels of the initial habit stock. With
H1 =0 .820 the proﬁle is almost ﬂat, and only if we increase H1 to 1.0 do we obtain a modest
increase in risk aversion at age 20. However, even in this case, risk aversion only increases
to 4.5, and converges to 4 within 3 years. Figure 6.5 plots the average wealth share invested
in stocks for the three diﬀerent cases and, as expected from the previous results, there is no
signiﬁcant change.
5.3.2 Curvature Parameter
Increasing the curvature parameter (ρ) yields the same results as in the ratio habit model.
Figure 6.6 compares the life-cycle proﬁle of risk aversion for ρ =5and ρ =2 .T h e t w o
curves are almost identical, except for the scaling factor (ρ). With ρ =5the investor is more
prudent and as a result she accumulates more wealth (ﬁgure 6.7). The participation rate
(not shown) is virtually unchanged as the wealth eﬀect and the risk aversion eﬀect oﬀset
each other almost completely. However, they both lead to reduction of the share of wealth
invested in stocks, which is visible in ﬁgure 6.8.
5.3.3 Habit Strength
A higher value of γ increases both risk aversion and prudence, just like a higher ρ,b u ti ta l s o
makes the investor more willing to smooth consumption intertemporally. Figure 6.9 plots
20This corresponds to 80% of the ﬁrst year’s expected income.
25risk aversion for the average household, for ρ =2and four diﬀerent values of γ (0, 0.3,a n d
0.5). In all cases we set H1 =0 .0, but the results are not very sensitive to this choice.21 As
shown before, as we increase the habit motive, the investor accumulates more wealth early
i nl i f ea n dt h e r e f o r es h eh a ss t r o n g e ri n c e n t i v et op a yt h eﬁxed cost. This eﬀect is even
stronger in the diﬀerence habit model, since now a higher γ also implies more prudence with
the corresponding increase in precautionary savings. As a result, as shown in ﬁgure 6.10,
stock market participation rate is in an increasing function of γ.
Since we are considering a diﬀerence habit speciﬁcation, if we increase both H1 and γ
substantially then we can mechanically exclude all households from the stock market, by
forcing them to consume all of their income just to keep up with their habit level. However,
since labor income is stochastic, this also implies that some households will be unable to
meet their minimum consumption requirement, and with this preference speciﬁcation such
an event generates a penalty of minus inﬁnity. Naturally, this creates serious problems for the
solution of the model. If the investor cannot rule out states with minus inﬁnity utility then
the optimum is not well-deﬁned. We believe that this is also not an economically interesting
result as ”minus inﬁnity utility” states do not seem to occur often in reality. Moreover, as
previously shown, this result does not hold in the ratio habit model, in which this penalty is
not equal to minus inﬁnity, or in the diﬀerence habit model with γ less than 0.5.T h e r e f o r e ,
we choose to limit our analysis to parameter choices for which the probability of those evens
occurring is either zero or negligible.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Motivated by the success of models with internal habit formation preferences in solving asset
pricing puzzles, we introduce these preferences in a life-cycle portfolio choice model with
uninsurable labor income risk and stock market participation costs. If internal habits can
explain the equity premium for a given consumption process, then, for a given asset return
process, these preferences should also explain the observed low stock market participation
rates and portfolio allocations conditional on participation. However, in contrast to this
21More on this on the next paragraph.
26intuition, we ﬁnd that habit formation preferences actually decrease the model’s ability
to match the existing empirical evidence. Intertemporal consumption smoothing becomes
more important and households increase their wealth accumulation. As a result, they have
a stronger incentive to pay the stock market entry cost and start investing in equities very
early in life. Moreover, after paying the ﬁxed cost, they invest virtually all of their wealth
in stocks. We conclude that internal habit formation preferences on their own are unlikely
to resolve existing portfolio allocation puzzles.
Our results are not inconsistent with the asset pricing literature. First, we have narrowed
our analysis to internal habit formation models. We have done so because considering ex-
ternal habits in the context of a partial-equilibrium model would be a substantial extension
since the aggregate consumption process cannot be taken as exogenous in this model: ag-
gregate consumption must be the outcome of individual consumption decisions. If aggregate
earnings shocks are included and aggregate consumption is time varying and aﬀecting the
external habit, then agents need to form expectations about the future evolution of this
habit. Unlike the Campbell-Cochrane (1999) external habit model, endogenous aggregate
consumption generates an endogenous evolution of the habit and it is not clear what agents’
expectations should be to be validated in equilibrium in this heterogeneous agent economy.
We think that this is a fruitful area for future research but is beyond the scope of this paper.
It should also be pointed out that we have not investigated the implications of stock market
mean reversion in this model but we also think that this extension and model uncertainty
on behalf of investors might be fruitful areas of future research.
Our results are not inconsistent with the asset pricing literature in a second, arguably
more important, dimension. Speciﬁcally, habit formation models explain the equity premium
puzzle by making investors less willing to hold stocks such that, in equilibrium, equities must
oﬀer a higher risk premium for markets to clear. However, in this paper we require the habit
formation model to go one step further. Rather than decreasing the willingness to hold
stocks by any means, we require the model to generate simultaneously modest stock market
participation rates in the population as a whole, and large riskless asset holdings for stock
market participants. We ﬁnd that the model can potentially deliver the latter, which by
itself is enough for the risk premium result, but this comes at the expense of not matching
27observed median stockholding patterns.
28Appendix A: Numerical Solution
We ﬁrst simplify the solution by exploiting the scale-independence of the maximization
problem and rewriting all variables as ratios to the permanent component of labor income
(Pit). The laws of motion and the value function can then be rewritten in terms of these
normalized variables, and we use lower case letters to denote them (for instance, xit ≡
Xit
Pit ).
This allows us to reduce the number of state variables to four; two continuous state variable
(cash on hand and habit) and two discrete state variables (age and participation status).
We discretize the state-space along the cash-on-hand and habit level dimensions (the two
continuous state variables), so that the relevant policy functions can now be represented on
a numerical grid.
We solve the model using backward induction. In the last period (t = T) the policy
functions are trivial, as the agent consumes all available wealth, cT = xT. As a result the
value function corresponds to the indirect utility function, VT(xT,.)=V (xT),r e g a r d l e s so f
whether the ﬁxed cost has been paid before or not, and regardless of the habit level. For
every age t prior to T, and for each point in the state space, we optimize using grid search.
So we need to compute the value associated with each level of consumption, the decision
to pay the ﬁxed cost, and the share of liquid wealth invested in stocks. From the Bellman
equation these values are given as current utility plus the discounted expected continuation
value (EtVt+1(.,.)), which we can compute since we have just obtained Vt+1.W ep e r f o r ma l l
numerical integrations using Gaussian quadrature to approximate the distributions of the
innovations to the labor income process and the risky asset returns. We evaluate the value
function, for points which do not lie on state space grid, using a cubic spline interpolation.
Once we have computed the value of all the alternatives we just pick the maximum, thus
obtaining the policy rules for the current period (St,a n dBt). At each point of the state
space, the participation decision is computed by comparing the value function conditional on
having paid the ﬁxed cost (adjusting for the payment of the cost itself) with the value function
conditional on non-payment. Substituting these decision rules in the Bellman equation we
obtain this period’s value function (Vt(.,.)) ,w h i c hi st h e nu s e dt os o l v et h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d ’ s
maximization problem. This process is iterated until t =1 .
29Appendix B: Computing the Transition Distributions
To ﬁnd the distribution of cash on hand, we ﬁrst compute the relevant optimal policy
rules; bond and stock policy functions for stock market participants and non-participants and
the {0,1} participation rule as a function of normalized cash on hand and normalized habits.
Let bI(x,h) and sI(x,h) denote the bond and stock policy rules respectively for individuals
participating in the stock market and let bO(x,h) be the savings (bonds) decision for the
individual out of the stock market. We assume that households start working life with zero
l i q u i da s s e t sf r o mt h el o w e s th a b i ts t a t ea n dﬁr s tu s et h eb o n dm a r k e ta sas a v i n gv e h i c l e
on account of the ﬁxed, one time, stock market entry cost.










where w(x,h) is deﬁned by the last equality and is conditional on { Pt
Pt+1} that includes the
deterministically evolving age-speciﬁc growth rate of individual labor income f(t,Zt).T h e
normalized habit, moreover, follows




Denote the transition matrix of moving from xj to xk and hl to hm,23 conditional on being
in the bond market as TO
kj,ml. Let {∆x,∆h} denote the distance between the equally spaced
discrete points of cash on hand and habit, respectively. The random permanent shock Pt
Pt+1 is
discretized using J =7grid points: Pt
Pt+1 = {Nm}m=J
m=1. TO
kj,ml =P r ( xt+1=k,h t+1=m|xt=j,h t=l)
22To avoid cumbersome notation, the subscript i that denotes a particular individual is omitted in what
follows.
23The normalized cash on hand grid is discretized between (xmin,xmax)w h e r ex min denotes the minimum
point on the equally spaced cash on hand grid and xmax the maximum point. Similarly, the normalized
habit grid is discretized between (hmin,hmax)w h e r eh min denotes the minimum point on the equally spaced











Letting the total number of cash on hand grid points equal to Gx and the total number of
habit grid points equal to Gh, we can construct the transition matrix from one combination
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G i v e nt h a tw eh a v ec o n d i t i o n e do nt h ep e r m a n e n ti n n o v a t i o n ,ht+1 is known as of time t,a n d
we can therefore compute this probability by keeping track of the frequency with which a
particular interval in normalized habits is “visited”, while making use of the approximation
that for small values of σ2
u, U ∼ N(exp(µu + .5 ∗ σ2
u),(exp(2 ∗ µu +( σ2
u)) ∗ (exp(σ2
u) − 1))).
Denoting the mean of U by U and its standard deviation by σ, the transition probability
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Given the transition matrix TO (a Gx ∗ Gh by Gx ∗ Gh matrix with TO
kj representing the
{kth,jth} element), the next period probabilities of each of the cash on hand and habit states











24The dependence on the determinastically evolving
exp(f(t,Zt))
exp(f(t+1,Zt+1)) is implied and is omitted from what
follows for expositional clarity.
31We next use the vector ΠO
th ( t h i si saGx by 1 vector representing the mass of the population
out of the stock market at each grid point conditional on a particular habit stock h)a n dt h e
participation policy rule to determine the percentage of households that optimally choose
to incur the ﬁxed cost and participate in the stock market. This is found by computing
the sum of the probabilities in ΠO
th for which x>x ∗
h, x∗
h being the trigger point that causes
participation (x∗
h is determined endogenously through the participation decision rule). These
probabilities are then deleted from ΠO
th a n da r ea d d e dt oΠI
th, and this is repeated for all habit
states. Finally, these conditional distributions {ΠO
t ,ΠI
t} are appropriately renormalized to
sum to one.
The participation rate can be computed at this stage as









The same methodology (but with more algebra and computations) can then be used to
derive the transition distribution for cash on hand conditional on being in the stock market
TI
t. For stock market participants, the normalized cash on hand evolution equation is
xt+1 =[ b(xt,h t)Rf + s(xt,h t)e Rt+1]{
Pt
Pt+1
} + Ut+1 (27)




where w(x) is now conditional on {e Rt+1, Pt
Pt+1}25. The random processes e R and Pt
Pt+1 are
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where the independence of Pt
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25The dependence on the non-random earnings component is omitted to simplify notation.
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Figure 2.2: Distributions for Normalized Cash on Hand (Retirement stage) 
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5Figure 6.9 - Risk Aversion for different values of Gamma
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